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THE struggle of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) to conclude theDoha round of multilateral trade negotiations brought again to the
forefront the important role that agricultural policy continues to play in inter-
national trade relations. The sector is subject to heavy-handed governmental
interventions throughout the world. Despite decades (even centuries) of econ-
omists’ arguments against agricultural subsidies and tariffs, political factors
continue to dominate agricultural policy setting (including trade policy) in both
rich and poor countries. In poor countries moreover, where agriculture is a very
important share of the economy and where food is a major consumption item,
the importance of agricultural policy as a public policy issue is obvious. How-
ever, also in rich countries, agricultural policy remains disproportionately
important compared to the relatively small share of agriculture in terms of
economic output. For example in the EU, the Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP) still absorbs more than 40% of the entire EU budget. Despite a strong
decline of agriculture in terms of employment and output in rich countries,
agriculture and agricultural policy remain so important for them in their trade
negotiations that they are willing to let the WTO negotiations collapse over dis-
putes on agricultural policy.
While there is a large literature on what determines government interven-
tions in agriculture and food markets – the so-called political economy of agri-
cultural and food policies – there is remarkably little attention paid to the
impact of international agreements such as the WTO. Moreover, virtually allThis work was financially supported by the Research Foundation – Flanders (FWO), the European
Commission and KU Leuven (EF, and Methusalem projects).
 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 9600 Garsington Road,
Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA. 1089
1090 J. SWINNEN, A. OLPER AND T. VANDEMOORTELEattention in this literature is focused on the level of support (or taxation) for
farmers, and much less on the issue of which policy instruments are used.
This is surprising because the distortionary effects of government interven-
tions equally depend on the choice of instrument as on the level of the inter-
vention. The WTO explicitly recognises this by classifying agricultural support
from different policy instruments in green, blue and amber ‘boxes’ according
to their distortionary impact (Tangermann, 1999). The green box includes sub-
sidies that do ‘not distort trade, or at most cause minimal distortions’ (Annex 2
of the URAA). WTO agreements limit the use of distorting measures while
non-distorting measures are not regulated (Josling and Tangermann, 1999). This
distinction between the level of support and the extent of market and trade
distortions is at the core of some important policy reforms, such as those of
the EU’s CAP over the past two decades. It is generally acknowledged that
the 1994 Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) under the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the current Doha WTO
negotiations played an important role in this (Swinnen, 2008).
There are many studies on the impact of the WTO on agriculture and food pol-
icies. However, the vast majority are either ex ante studies or qualitative analyses
(e.g. Anderson et al., 2001, 2006; Diao et al., 2001; Hertel et al., 2004). There is
also recent econometric work on the impact of WTO on trade flows (e.g. Rose,
2004; Subramanian and Wei, 2007; Grant and Boys, 2010; Chang and Lee,
2011). However, there are no ex post quantitative analysis of the impact of the
WTO URAA on agricultural support and the choice of policy instruments.
This paper is the first to quantitatively estimate the impact of the WTO on
agricultural and food policies, focusing both on the extent and the type of agri-
cultural protection. For our model specification, we draw on the literature on
the political economy of agricultural and food policies. For our key policy indi-
cators, we use OECD data on support to agriculture which is disaggregated by
policy instruments.2. DATA AND POLICY INDICATORS
Since 1986, the OECD calculates policy support to agriculture (OECD
PSE=CSE database, 2010). The total amount of support to agriculture is
referred to as the producer support estimate (PSE). Initially, the PSE calcula-
tions were limited to OECD member states. Recently, some other countries,
such as China and Brazil, are covered. The PSE data cover 28 countries. For
OECD members, the period is 1986–2009; for non-members, the coverage
starts around 1990. The OECD’s calculation of policy support distinguishes
between several instruments (Table 1). For the purpose of our analysis, it is
convenient to combine the instruments into ‘market price support’ (mps), ‘input 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
TABLE 1
Support by Policy Instrument in the OECD
1986–88 2007–09
Value Share Value Share
Market price support 195.8 0.82 125.2 0.49
Input subsidies 20.4 0.09 33.4 0.13
Direct payments 22.4 0.09 98.1 0.38
Total PSE (US$ billions) 238.7 1.00 256.8 1.00
Percentage PSE 37 22
Notes:
(i) The values are averages for the periods for OECD countries listed in Table 2. (ii) The policy instruments
considered are based on the following items of the PSE database: ‘market price support’ refers to support
based on commodity outputs (items A1 and A2, of the PSE database); ‘input subsidies’ is the sum of pay-
ments based on input use and miscellaneous payments (items B and G); ‘direct payments’ refers to different
payments decoupled or partially decoupled from production (items from C to F).
(iii) PSE: producer support estimate.
Source: Own computation based on OECD PSE=CSE database (2010).
IMPACT OF WTO ON AGRICULTURAL POLICIES 1091subsidies’ (is) and ‘direct payments’ (dp). mps includes transfers through tar-
iffs, price support and subsidies directly linked to agricultural production.
These instruments are typically considered as being the most distortive. Input
subsidies include investment aid, labour subsidies, land protection programmes,
etc. The third category, dp, includes fully decoupled and partially decoupled
agricultural payments. These instruments are the least distortive.
Figure 1 and Table 1 show that for the OECD country sample as a whole, there
has been very little change in the total amount of support for agriculture (PSE)
over time (around US$ 250 million), but the share of support in the total agricultural
output (pse) has declined significantly, from 37% to 22%, on average.
Importantly, there has been a clear shift in policy instruments. In the late
1980s, the share of market price support (mpsh) in total support was more than
80%, whereas the share of direct payments (dpsh) and inputs subsidies (ish)
made up less than 10%. In the next two decades, the share of market price sup-
port declined and that of direct payments increased substantially. By the late
2000s, the former had decreased to 49% and the latter increased to 61%. In
contrast, the share of input subsidies remained almost constant. However, there
are large variations among countries in their shares of the policy instruments in
total support (Table 2). Considering the OECD sample, in 1986 mpsh varied
from 19% in New Zealand to 99% in South Korea, and dpsh varied from 0%
in several countries to 37% in the US. Also in recent years, there remain large
differences across countries with, for example, dpsh varying from almost 0% in
Poland, New Zealand, Korea and Japan to 60% in the EU.
The indicators in Figure 1 show that the shift from market price support to
direct payments started in the early 1990s, which was the time of the conclusion 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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FIGURE 1
Evolution of Total Producer Support Estimate (PSE), the Share of Market Price Support (mpsh)
and of Direct Payments (dpsh) in the OECD Countries
Source: Own Computation Based on OECD PSE=CSE Database (2010).
1092 J. SWINNEN, A. OLPER AND T. VANDEMOORTELEof the URAA. This suggests that the 1994 URAA may have had an impact on the
instruments used but not on the total level of support. However, this figure is, of
course, far from conclusive evidence. Other factors may have played a role. In
the next section, we use an econometric model to get a more precise estimate on
the impact of WTO.3. ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS
a. Data and Basic Specification
We use an econometric model to estimate whether the 1994 URAA
GATT=WTO agreement had an impact on the total support given to agriculture
and=or on instrument choice, while controlling for other factors.
Our key-dependent variables are the share of market price support in total
support (mpsh)1 and the total level of support measured as a percentage of the1 Similar results are obtained when using the share of direct payments in total support (dpsh) as
dependent variable because both are strongly (inversely) correlated (see Figure 1). These results
can be obtained from the authors upon request.
 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
TABLE 2
Share of Market Price Support (mpsh), Input Subsidies (ish) and Direct Payments (dpsh) in Total
Support (PSE)
Period Coverage Initial Year Final Year
mpsh ish dpsh mpsh ish dpsh
OECD countries
European Union 1986–2009 0.92 0.05 0.03 0.25 0.14 0.60
United States 1986–2009 0.44 0.18 0.37 0.18 0.30 0.51
Australia 1986–2009 0.75 0.17 0.08 0.00 0.51 0.49
Switzerland 1986–2009 0.83 0.10 0.07 0.54 0.06 0.41
Norway 1986–2009 0.72 0.10 0.18 0.55 0.05 0.40
Canada 1986–2009 0.56 0.16 0.28 0.58 0.07 0.35
Slovakia 1986–2003 0.88 0.08 0.04 0.51 0.19 0.31
Iceland 1986–2009 0.93 0.07 0.00 0.65 0.08 0.27
Czech Republic 1986–2003 0.82 0.05 0.14 0.64 0.11 0.25
Mexico 1986–2009 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.35 0.43 0.22
Hungary 1986–2003 0.80 0.06 0.14 0.54 0.30 0.16
Japan 1986–2009 0.93 0.04 0.03 0.88 0.03 0.09
Turkey 1986–2009 0.77 0.23 0.00 0.92 0.03 0.05
Korea 1986–2009 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.92 0.03 0.05
New Zealand 1986–2009 0.19 0.48 0.32 0.42 0.55 0.03
Poland 1986–2003 0.75 0.17 0.08 0.60 0.38 0.01
Non OECD countries
Latvia 1986–2003 0.99 0.01 0.00 0.26 0.36 0.38
China 1993–2007 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.21 0.48 0.31
Ukraine 1986–2007 0.81 0.19 0.00 0.39 0.37 0.24
Slovenia 1986–2003 0.88 0.09 0.03 0.73 0.05 0.22
Estonia 1986–2003 0.88 0.10 0.01 0.51 0.32 0.17
Lithuania 1986–2003 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.63 0.23 0.14
Romania 1986–2005 0.96 0.03 0.00 0.89 0.07 0.04
Russia 1986–2007 0.65 0.24 0.11 0.54 0.44 0.03
Brazil 1995–2007 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.53 0.46 0.02
Chile 1990–2007 0.96 0.04 0.00 0.13 0.86 0.01
South Africa 1994–2007 0.97 0.03 0.01 0.69 0.31 0.00
Bulgaria 1986–2005 0.99 0.01 0.00 0.31 0.69 0.00
Source: Own computation based on OECD PSE=CSE database (2010).
IMPACT OF WTO ON AGRICULTURAL POLICIES 1093production value (pse). Both variables are based on the 2010 OECD Producer
and Consumer Support Estimates database.
The key explanatory variable, WTO, is a dummy variable which takes on the
value of 1 if the countries were subject to WTO URAA constraints, and 0 if
not. The URAA was signed in 1994 and implemented starting in 1995. For
countries that joined the GATT before 1994, WTO takes the value of 1 since
1995, the first year of the implementation period, and 0 otherwise. For coun-
tries that joined the WTO after 1995, the WTO dummy equals 1 from the
accession year onwards. 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
TABLE 3
Regression Results: Dependent Variable = pse
Dependent Variable pse pse pse pse
Estimator OLS GMM-SYS OLS GMM-SYS
Two Step Two Step
1 2 3 4
WTO 1.735 2.186 1.133 3.28
1.961 1.664 1.16 2.317
6_years_before 1.194 0.881 0.325 1.127
2.258 1.551 1.093 1.246
Lagged pse 0.644*** 0.559*** 0.878*** 0.680***
0.059 0.063 0.045 0.123
Lagged exps 8.136*** 9.711*** 3.142** 8.513**
1.384 2.078 1.306 3.688
Lagged gdppc 0.138*** 0.201** 0.016 0.014
0.044 0.099 0.037 0.102
Constant 6.561*** 7.620*** 3.913** 10.120*
2.205 2.346 1.69 5.295
Sample All All OECD OECD
No. of countries 28 28 16 16
No. of obs. 517 517 326 326
Adj. R2 0.83 0.95
No. of instr. 28 18
Hansen 0.43 0.37
AR(1) 0.07 0.01
AR(2) 0.12 0.29
Notes:
(i) Robust standard errors are reported under the coefficients. (ii) The system generalised method of moments
(GMM) estimator is implemented in STATA using the xtabond2 command, with the option collapse to limit
instruments proliferation (see Roodman, 2009). (iii) The last three rows of regressions 2 and 4 report p-values
of the Hansen over-identification test, and the Arellano and Bond first and second order tests of autocorrela-
tion, respectively. (iv) *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
1094 J. SWINNEN, A. OLPER AND T. VANDEMOORTELETo test this WTO effect, we need to control for other effects. For the pse
regression, we draw on the huge literature on the determinants of agricultural
protection.2 This literature suggests several covariates that can be used to
explain the level of agricultural protection. However, as shown by Olper and
Swinnen (2011), the level of GDP and the trade balance of a country are the
two single most important factors affecting agricultural protection in a large
panel of both developing and developed countries. Therefore, our basic model
is a parsimonious specification for the pse regression using only these two
covariates as control variables: real GDP per capita (gdppc) taken from the2 There is an extensive literature analysing the determinants of agricultural and food policies (e.g.
Gardner, 1987; Swinnen et al., 2001; Olper, 2007; Anderson, 2010). See de Gorter and Swinnen
(2002) and Swinnen (2009, 2010), for reviews of the literature.
 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
IMPACT OF WTO ON AGRICULTURAL POLICIES 1095World Development Indicators (World Bank) and the net export share in total
production (exsh), based on FAO data.3
For the mpsh regression, there is much less literature to draw on. Political
economy studies of agricultural policy have focused primarily on explaining
the level of policy intervention and much less on the explanation of the instru-
ments used for interventions. We base our choice of control variables on the
hypotheses of Swinnen et al. (2011). They argue that instrument choice is also
importantly influenced by a country’s level of development and its trade status.
First, less developed countries are typically characterised by less efficient insti-
tutions and tax systems (e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001). Hence, tariffs
and other market interventions are relatively easier (i.e. with lower transaction
costs) to implement (than e.g. direct income subsidies to farmers in remote
rural areas) and provide a relatively more important source of government reve-
nue. To control for the institutional development and administrative capacity of
a country, we use real GDP per capita (gdppc). Second, because of government
revenue motives, countries which import more benefit more from tariff reve-
nues (or suffer less from export subsidies). Hence, they have an additional
incentive to choose for tariffs (which are included in our measure of market
price support, mps) as instruments to support farmers. As an indicator of the
trade status, we use the net export share in total production (exsh).
There may be significant path dependency in total support and policy instrument
choice. To account for this, we include as explanatory variables in both the pse and
mpsh regressions the level of the dependent variable of the previous period.4b. Identification Issues and Robustness Checks
An important concern is a potential endogeneity bias caused by omitted
policy factors that are correlated with the WTO dummy and the error term, but
which are difficult to observe. For example, the politics of the incumbent
government might prefer free-market policies, which leads both to membership
of the WTO and a reduction in agricultural policy. We address this issue in
several distinct ways.3 More specifically, exsh = (export value  import value)=production value.
4 One may argue that the mpsh model should also include the level of support (pse). By including
pse as an explanatory variable, one may analyse the relation between the policy level and instru-
ment choice – and vice versa. However, there are two econometric reasons that render the inclusion
of the level of support problematic. First, pse is endogenous as the level of support is likely to
depend itself on the policy instrument choice. Second, as discussed above, our explanatory vari-
ables, gdppc and exsh, are also key determinants of the overall protection level. While the first prob-
lem could potentially be solved by using a simultaneous equation model, the second problem
precludes finding good instruments for pse in the mpsh specifications. We therefore do not include
the level of support in the regressions. (The same logic holds for including mpsh in the pse
regression).
 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
1096 J. SWINNEN, A. OLPER AND T. VANDEMOORTELEFirst, we run separate regressions using ordinary least squares (OLS) and
dynamic panel estimations, that is, the generalised method of moments (GMM).
The latter estimator, by first-differencing, controls for any (time-invariant) country-
specific omitted variable bias. A potential problem with the OLS estimator is that
the lagged dependent variable may be endogenous to the fixed effects in the error
term, which results in the well-known dynamic panel bias (Roodman, 2009). To
address this potential source of bias, we use the system GMM estimator proposed
by Blundell and Bond (1998), given the high persistence of the dependent variable.5
Second, given the potentially strong persistence in our dependent variables,
by using dynamic panel models we control additionally, at least partially, for
omitted country-specific and time-varying factors which are subsumed in the
lagged dependent variable.
Third, to properly identify the causality of the policy changes induced by the
WTO agreement, we follow the approach of Persson (2005) by adding in every
specification a ‘pre-treatment’ dummy (6_years_before), equal to 1 in the six
years before 1995 or, for countries joining the WTO later, before the year of entry
in the WTO (0 otherwise). This dummy variable allows to assess whether the cau-
sality effectively runs from the WTO to policy change and not the other way
round because of, for example, a pre-treatment trend in the dependent variables.
Fourth, as a further robustness check, we control for the political orientation of
the incumbent government, using the variable government_orientation which
equals 1, 2 or 3 for, respectively, a right-, centre- or left-wing-oriented government.
The variable is based on the Database on Political Institutions (DPI) of the World
Bank (see Beck et al., 2001), following Dutt and Mitra (2005) and Olper (2007). The
underlying idea is that, depending on its political orientation, an incumbent govern-
ment may, for example, prefer free-market policies which leads both to membership
of the WTO and a reduction in agricultural protection through market price sup-
port. If this is the case, then by adding the political orientation of the incumbent
government, we are able, at least partially, to control for this estimation bias.
Fifth, because there is some evidence on asymmetric effects between old
and new GATT=WTO members (Anderson and Swinnen, 2008; Grant and
Boys, 2010), we control for the number of years that a country has been mem-
ber of the GATT=WTO, WTO_age. This variable is proportional to the number
of years a country has been member of the GATT=WTO and is normalised
such that it equals 1 for countries that joined the GATT in 1948, and 0 for
countries that are not yet member of the WTO.65 In principle, an alternative estimator is the standard least squares with dummy variables (LSDV).
However, this dynamic panel estimator may also be biased due to the endogeneity of the lagged
dependent variable (Blundell and Bond, 1998). The statistical diagnostics reported in Tables 3, 4
and 5 confirm that the correct estimator is the system GMM.
6 The variable is defined as: WTO_age = (2009  year of membership)=61, where 61 = 2009
1948.
 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
IMPACT OF WTO ON AGRICULTURAL POLICIES 1097Finally, we test our empirical specifications on the overall sample of 28
countries, as well as on the subsample of the 16 OECD countries for which
data are available from 1986 onwards.4. RESULTS
Tables 3 and 4 present the main regression results. Columns 1 and 2 are
regressions with all data, columns 3 and 4 with OECD countries only. Columns
1 and 3 are OLS estimations; columns 2 and 4 are system GMM estimations.
The main results are consistent across the different specifications. The WTO
variable has no significant effect on the total level of support (pse). While the
estimated coefficients are negative, they are not significant. In contrast, there is
a strongly significant negative effect on the share of market price support
(mpsh). This suggests that the GATT=WTO rules have not reduced total subsi-
dies to farmers, but do represent an effective constraint on the use of
distortionary agricultural policies.
The estimated coefficients for WTO are higher for the OECD sample, which
suggests that the WTO effect was stronger for OECD members, a result in line
with the special and differentiated treatment reserved for developing countries
in the GATT=WTO. Note that there is no evidence of a ‘pre-treatment’ effect,
because the 6_years_before variable is never significant.
The control variables have the expected signs; pse is negatively related to the
net export share of a country, positively related to a country’s level of develop-
ment, and displays a strong persistence, that is, current protection is an important
predictor of future protection. mpsh is negatively related to both the net export
share and the level of economic development and also displays strong persistence.
The Arellano-Bond tests for first- and second-order autocorrelation, AR(1)
and AR(2), respectively, indicate the presence of first-order serial correlation,
suggesting that the model dynamics are correctly specified. The Hansen test, to
check for the consistency of the system GMM estimator, confirms that our set
of instruments is valid. The system GMM results are similar to the OLS results,
although controlling for unobserved country effects increases somewhat the
magnitude of the estimated effects.
Table 5 presents results of additional robustness tests for the mpsh regres-
sion. First, columns 1 and 3 display system GMM results, for the overall and
OECD sample, respectively, including the variable that measures the orienta-
tion of the incumbent government, gov_orientation. Its estimated coefficient is
not statistically significant.77 Note that by including gov_orientation we lose two countries, Russia and Lithuania, and several
observations from transition countries due to missing observations in the DPI data set.
 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
TABLE 4
Regression Results: Dependent Variable = mpsh
Dependent Variable mpsh mpsh mpsh mpsh
Estimator OLS GMM-SYS OLS GMM-SYS
Two Step Two Step
1 2 3 4
WTO 0.042*** 0.043** 0.049*** 0.064***
0.014 0.020 0.014 0.015
6_years before 0.007 0.021* 0.002 0.010
0.013 0.011 0.010 0.011
Lagged mpsh 0.777*** 0.584*** 0.738*** 0.621***
0.045 0.150 0.055 0.051
Lagged exps 0.044*** 0.082** 0.062*** 0.099***
0.011 0.032 0.008 0.019
Lagged gdppc 0.001** 0.003* 0.003*** 0.004***
0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001
Constant 0.174*** 0.323** 0.227*** 0.331***
0.034 0.119 0.037 0.054
Sample All All OECD OECD
No. of countries 28 28 16 16
No. of obs. 448 448 319 319
Adj. R2 0.75 0.78
No. of instr. 25 16
Hansen 0.43 0.73
AR(1) 0.02 0.05
AR(2) 0.70 0.70
Notes:
(i) Robust standard errors are reported under the coefficients. (ii) The system generalised method of moments
(GMM) estimator is implemented in STATA using the xtabond2 command, with the option collapse to limit
instruments proliferation (see Roodman, 2009). (iii) The last three rows of regressions 2 and 4 report p-values
of the Hansen over-identification test, and the Arellano and Bond first- and second-order tests of autocorrela-
tion, respectively. (iv) *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
1098 J. SWINNEN, A. OLPER AND T. VANDEMOORTELEIn the regressions in columns 2 and 4, we add the variable WTO_Age to
control for the years of GATT=WTO membership. Its estimated coefficient is
positive and significant at the 10% level in the full sample, suggesting that old
members tend to have more distorting agricultural policies. Not surprisingly,
this effect is insignificant for the OECD subsample, because of insufficient var-
iation in the years of membership in this subsample. Most importantly, the
coefficient of the WTO variable remains strongly significant, which means that
including these additional variables does not affect the key conclusions on the
impact of the GATT=WTO on instrument choice.
In summary, these additional robustness checks provide further support for
our conclusions. Controlling for both government orientation and the years of
membership, the WTO effect is significantly negative, while the ‘pre-treatment’ 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
TABLE 5
Robustness Checks: Dependent Variable = mpsh
Dependent Variable mpsh mpsh mpsh mpsh
Estimator GMM-SYS GMM-SYS GMM-SYS GMM-SYS
Two Step Two Step Two Step Two Step
1 2 3 4
WTO 0.050* 0.057** 0.069*** 0.065**
0.025 0.024 0.021 0.030
6_years_before 0.024 0.025 0.016 0.021
0.018 0.018 0.013 0.015
Lagged mpsh 0.596*** 0.551*** 0.530*** 0.484**
0.160 0.170 0.177 0.206
Lagged exps 0.092** 0.131*** 0.129*** 0.157***
0.035 0.045 0.041 0.052
Lagged gdppc 0.003* 0.006** 0.006** 0.008**
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003
Government orientation 0.011 0.015 0.013 0.012
0.013 0.013 0.013 0.015
WTO_ Age 0.139* 0.146
0.077 0.090
Constant 0.299** 0.251* 0.387** 0.336*
0.14 0.136 0.167 0.179
Sample All All OECD OECD
No. of countries 26 26 16 16
No. of obs. 392 392 296 296
No. of instr. 26 27 16 17
Hansen 0.22 0.23 0.50 0.50
AR(1) 0.04 0.04 0.09 0.10
AR(2) 0.25 0.25 0.28 0.29
Notes:
(i) Robust standard errors are reported under the coefficients. (ii) The system generalised method of moments
(GMM) estimator is implemented in STATA using the xtabond2 command, with the option collapse to limit
instruments proliferation (see Roodman, 2009). (iii) The last three rows of regressions 2 and 4 report p-values
of the Hansen over-identification test, and the Arellano and Bond first- and second-order tests of autocorrela-
tion, respectively. (iv) *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
IMPACT OF WTO ON AGRICULTURAL POLICIES 1099dummy is always positive but insignificant. Together this indicates that this
international agreement contributed to a shift towards direct income support
away from market price support but did not significantly affect the total amount
of support.5. CONCLUSION
Agricultural and food policies continue to be a major issue in the WTO
negotiations. The sector is subject to heavy-handed governmental interventions 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
1100 J. SWINNEN, A. OLPER AND T. VANDEMOORTELEthroughout the world. The literature on what determines government interven-
tions in agriculture and food markets pays relatively little attention to the
impact of international agreements such as the WTO. Moreover, virtually all
attention is focused on the level of support (or taxation) for farmers, and much
less on the issue of which policy instruments are used. Yet market and trade
distortions depend more on the instrument used than on the level of support, a
distinction explicitly recognised by the WTO. In addition, most studies on the
impact of WTO agreements on agricultural policies are ex ante simulations.
We use OECD data to document the total amount of support and which
instruments are used. The data show that there has not been a reduction in total
support but that there has been a significant shift from market price support to
direct payments over the past 25 years.
Over this period, several countries joined the WTO, while within the
WTO=GATT framework, there was an agreement to reduce agricultural trade
distortions under the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA). We
use OECD data on total support and instrument choice in agricultural policy.
Our econometric analysis provides evidence that this WTO agreement (or join-
ing the WTO) did not cause a significant reduction in the total amount of sup-
port to agriculture but that it caused a significant shift from distortionary to
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